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Introduction
1.1 Let me begin with a story about intellectual interchange which Pierre would have liked. It is well known
that the philosopher Wittgenstein changed the entire tenor of his philosophy after 1929, primarily as a result
of a critique by the Italian economist Piero Sraffa in the course of their regular walks and conversations in
Trinity College, Cambridge. Sraffa is said to have convinced Wittgenstein that his idea that a proposition
and what it describes must have the same logical form was untenable by brushing his chin with his
ﬁngertips in a Neapolitan gesture which indicates scepticism. ‘What is the logical form of this’? he wanted
to know. These conversations were clearly of fundamental importance to Wittgenstein. What he owed to
Sraffa, he said, was an “anthropological way” of seeing philosophical problems, i.e. the realisation that
social conventions and rules contribute to the meaning of our utterances and gestures.
1.2 They were clearly not equally important to Sraffa, as he told his pupil and friend (and Pierre Bourdieu’s
friend) Amartya Sen[1]. The point he made, Sraffa said, was ‘rather obvious’. But it was obvious only
because this ‘anthropological’ approach to philosophy was a common subject of discussion in the leftwing
intellectual circles to which Sraffa belonged, and particularly familiar to Antonio Gramsci, with whom Sraffa
was intimately linked from the days of Ordine Nuovo to his death. I begin my paper with this story, not
because it happens that Gramsci was concerned with the same questions as Bourdieu, though in a
different way and operating in an Italian and not a French intellectual context, but because it illustrates the
cultural subjectivity of all intellectual exchanges. We read our own interests into an author, not his.
Inevitably non-French historians read Bourdieu, whose work could not possibly have come from anyone but
a French intellectual formed in and writing in France after the world wars, not in terms of his own thinking
and its development, but against their own. We are conducting not a dialogue of the deaf, for I think I
understand what he is saying, but parallel soliloquies which sometimes appear to coincide. I would ask you
to bear this in mind if my reading of Pierre’s work is selective and I take some of it for granted.
1.3 In the light of this preliminary warning, what has Bourdieu contributed, what can he, contribute to the
work of historians today? The ﬁrst thing to note about him is the centrality of both history and
interdisciplinarity in his work. The 100th number of the Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales (1993)
is before me. Bourdieu intended it as an occasion for ‘la reafﬁrmation d’un projet.’ Of its nine articles ﬁve
are by historians or on plainly historical subjects and, incidentally, six are by authors from outside France.
Indeed, a glance at the Actes might well suggest that the journal became increasingly preoccupied with
historical enquiry in Bourdieu’s last decade. And he was used to working with historians, since he found a
home in Braudel’s Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, and was listed by a German-American survey,
together with E.P.Thompson, Eric Hobsbawm, Peter Laslett and Maurice Godelier ,as part of a current of
anthropological interest to be found in contemporary French and British historiography, Marxist and non-
marxist[2]. He joined Clemens Heller’s exciting international ‘tables rondes de l’histoire sociale’ and
published his commentary on our discussion of the history of strikes[3] . I vividly remember our
conversations at the end of the 1970s on the need for a history of sports – in which he and the Actes took
a considerable interest. In short, Pierre was at ease with historians, or at least with some of them.
1.4 And yet, by Bourdieu’s own decision he chose to become not a historian but a philosopher turned
sociologist. In his major writings references to historians are considerably rarer than those to philosophers
and ethnographers/social anthropologists, and very few – perhaps among his French contemporaries only
Georges Duby – tend to occur in several volumes. Moreover, there are a number of historians of past or
present eminence whose names are never cited, as well as the occasional famous historian – Michelet for
instance – whom he speciﬁcally rejects. Readers of Homo Academicus must be aware that he was critical
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for him was unstinted, he was clearly not sympathetic to the kind of history of the ‘longue dur￩e’ then
popular among the Annales historians[4] And he frequently detects in the historical profession a lack of
interest in the historic analysis of the concepts they use in analysing the past, in an ‘usage reﬂexif de
l’histoire’[5]. That is no entirely fair, especially to the Germans – one thinks of the encyclopedic
Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe – but it is true that historians, other than the historians of ideas, are not
usually much involved in philosophy. Nor do philosophers practise much history. In this respect David
Hume in the eighteenth century and Croce with his school in the 20th are exceptional, but their historical
work is not much remembered.
1.5 Nevertheless, the past is central to Bourdieu’s work, because it is the soil that feeds the roots of the
present, and of our capacity to understand and deal with it. And conversely, I am one of many historians
who admire him and have been inspired by him. For one thing, had he wanted to, he could have been a
historian himself, which is visibly not the case with Michel Foucault, Louis Althusser or Derrida, to cite but
some names of French thinkers familiar to historians abroad. He had the historian’s passion for what was
concrete, speciﬁc and singular, the curiosity and gift of looking at everything in sight which good
anthropological ﬁeldworkers share with good historians. Braudel used to say: ‘historians are never on
vacation. Every time I get into a train, I discover something.’ Bourdieu would have approved. Only a man
naturally gifted for social history would have immediately noted a characteristic of rural society, namely
that: ‘la fr￩quence relative des dictons, d’interdits, des proverbes et des rites fortement r￩gl￩s d￩croit
quand on va des pratiques qui sont li￩es l’activit￩ agricole ou qui lui sont directement associ￩es… aux
divisions de la journ￩e ou aux moments de la vie humaine, sans parler des domaines apparemment
abandonn￩s ￠ l’arbitraire, comme l’organisation int￩rieure de la maison, les parties du corps, les couleurs
ou les animaux.’(SP 333). He was an equally passionate and perceptive observer of what lies below the
surface of everyday life in his country: the unspoken and unrecorded assumptions of contemporary French
life, the symptoms that indicate the nation’s health. But what are the actual questions Bourdieu asked
about history? Are they the same as those asked by social historians? Yes and no.
1.6 I think history had a double function for him. In the ﬁrst place it was the central tool for what he called
‘la critique reﬂexive’, that is to say how thinkers become conscious of the speciﬁcity, even the subjectivity,
of the social observer’s point of view, and also of the disciplines describing themselves as ‘social science’
.Whoever tries to understand the social world does so on the basis of what Bourdieu calls ‘objectivist
presuppositions’, because only these allow us to judge the veracity of our observations, to provide a
legitimation for our methodology, a justiﬁcation for our generalisations. This was all the more essential for a
sociologist like Bourdieu, for whom scientiﬁc theory ‘se d￩voile seulement dans le travail empirique o￹ elle
se r￩alise ‘ (R￩ponses, op. cit., p. 136). But since Marx – the Marx who refused to think of himself as a
Marxist and invented the sociology of knowledge- it has been clear that the road to the reality we
investigate inevitably leads through the dense and dark forest of the assumptions and wishes the
researcher brings to his work. We come to our task not as free-ﬂoating brains but as men and women
brought up in a certain situation in a certain kind of society, in a particular patch of the globe, at a particular
moment in history. Nowhere is this more true than in sociology, at least if we think of it as Pierre did as
having as its object ‘les champs de lutte,-non seulement les champs des luttes de classe mais les
champs des luttes de la pens￩e scientiﬁque. ‘ But these are personal as well as social characteristics,
even though for Bourdieu ‘the socialized body (what is called the individual or the person) is not opposed to
society; it is one of its forms of existence.’ (Sociology in Questions p 15) He knew that the purely private
man or woman must never be left out of sight. That is why for him ‘cette sorte d’autoanalyse fait partie…
des conditions de d￩veloppement de ma pens￩e. Si je puis dire ce que je dis aujourdhui, c’est sans doute
parce que je n’ai pas cess￩ d‘utiliser la sociologie contre mes determinations et mes limites sociales; et
notamment pour transformer les humeurs, les sympathies et les antipathies intellectuelles qui sont, je
crois, si importantes dans les choix intellectuels’(Choses dites 37). Reﬂexive autobiography is a necessary
part of his thought and of his writings, for these constitute not a ﬁnished corpus but Bourdieu’s continuing,
sometimes repetitive, always developing but never-ending dialogue with his times.
1.7 History is what ,for Bourdieu, allows us to overcome these obstacles. ‘C’est en d￩couvrant son
historicit￩ que la raison se donne les moyens d’￩chapper ￠ l’histoire’ (Choses Dites 36). ‘Il-y-a une histoire
de la raison; cela ne veut pas dire que la raison se reduise ￠ son histoire, mais il-y-a des conditions
historiques de l’apparition sociale de communication qui rendent possible la production de la verit￩.’ (ibid
43-44).
1.8 However, history is not only the gate through which we must pass if we want to reach reality. It is a
central element of that reality itself. “I endeavour to show that what is called the social is history. History is
inscribed in things – in institutions (machines, instruments, laws,scientiﬁc theories etc.) and also in bodies.
My whole effort aims to discover history where it is best hidden, in people’s heads and in the postures of
their bodies. The unconscious is history. That’s true, for instance, of the categories of thought and
perception that we spontaneously apply to the social world.’ (Soc in Q 46) Bourdieu calls for ‘une histoire
structurale…qui ferait appara￮tre chaque ￩tat successif de la structure examin￩e comme ￩tant ￠ la fois le
produit des luttes precedentes pour maintenir et transformer cette structure et le principe des
transformations qui en d￩coulent, ￠ travers des contradictions, les tensions et les rapports de force qui la
constituent.’ (R￩ponses, op. cit., p. 68). .
1.9 Bourdieu himself hoped, by means of his concept of ‘ﬁelds’ (champs) ‘de faire dispara￮tre l’opposition
entre reproduction et transformation, statique et dynamique, ou structure et histoire.’ (R￩ponses, op. cit., p.
67) As a historian of social transformations I am incompletely convinced. Certainly Bourdieu’s model helps
us to understand ‘le surgissement des ev￨nements purement historiques, telles que la crise de mai 1968
ou n’importe quelle autre grande rupture historique’ (ibid.), assuming that the two such crises he has
analysed in some detail, May 1968 and the Paris revolution of 1848 can be regarded as ‘grandes ruptures
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revolutions which has dropped into the background since the decline and fall of Soviet Communism . The
early 21st century is not a historical moment favourable to social revolutions in practice or in theory . But
interest in this type of ‘rupture historique’, and in Bourdieu’s studies of it, will no doubt revive .
1.10 And yet, the model seems to me to use a somewhat narrow and chronologically short-range concept
of what constitutes ‘une grande rupture historique’ , and it does not sufﬁciently enquire into the relation
between the ‘ruptures’ in this sense - mostly those of the 19th and 20th centuries with which he was chieﬂy
concerned - and the dynamics of the global process of the evolution and transformation of human
existence and activities on this planet . The central problem of world history is and must be the process
which has brought homo sapiens from the palaeolithic to the era of the internet. It is (so far) an
extraordinary but complex success story of how a particular species of mammals has become capable of
transforming itself by transforming its environment- of ‘acting upon ‘nature’ as John Locke and Karl Marx
would have said. This process has accelerated so dramatically in our own lifetimes , that we can observe it
running parallel with that of the traditional history of events in politics, culture, the arts, and more or less at
a comparable pace. In my view the extraordinary and growing acceleration of social change since the
middle of the 20th century is by far the most important historical phenomenon of our times – a
phenomenon utterly without precedent. If there are still historians in the year 3000 their books about the
last century will pay far more attention to it than to the wars, massacres and revolutions of that century.
1.11 While Bourdieu’s model of ‘ﬁelds of struggle’and his methods are applicable to any situation, it was
designed for other historical questions. It is therefore only of limited relevance. It was not designed to
explain either of the two central experiences of human history, the ‘neolithic revolution’ which transformed
humanity from a species of hunter-gatherers into one of cultivators, and the industrial revolution which is
still transforming our globe..
1.12 On the other hand Bourdieu’s approach is quite indispensable for the understanding of the operations
of social reproduction, including the reproduction of social systems basically embodying inequality, that is
to say for practical purposes all social systems. It is perhaps most fully put forward in the remarkable Le
Sens Pratique (1980), in my view the central pillar of his oeuvre. Here lies the value of Bourdieu’s
extremely fertile concept of ‘habitus’, which uniﬁes structure and human action through practice in a given
world, the agent as the product of society and the past and as a subjective pursuer of strategies.(See esp.
R￩ponses, op. cit., pp. 114-15)[6] . I cannot imagine a historian who has ever taken an interest in pre-
capitalist societies, especially peasant societies, who does not immediately recognize the extraordinary
perceptiveness of everything Bourdieu says about them. Any student of the actual operations of
customary or judge-made law in such societies will recognize the ﬂexibility with which general principles
are adjusted to particular persons, circumstances and social relationships. ‘ L’habitus a partie li￩e avec le
ﬂou, le vague’ (Choses Dites, op. cit., p. 96). It is also part of Bourdieu’s acute power of observation that
he recognizes its limits ‘dans des situations critiques et dangereuses’ and therefore the necessity for
formalization (‘codiﬁcation’) of procedures, and consequently what he calls ‘une vertu propre de la forme
‘(ibid). Though all this is easy to recognize in preindustrial societies, it is Bourdieu’s enormous merit to
have recognized the continued force of habitus-shaped practice in contemporary capitalist societies. It also
provides him with a supplementary justiﬁcation for criticising theories of so-called ‘rational choice’. If he
were alive, he would be delighted by the story – it recently appeared in a lecture to the American Academy
by an eminent mathematician, expert in the statistics of probability – about how he tried to decide whether
to move from Stanford to Harvard. He consulted a friend about the problem. ‘But you are an eminent
decision theorist’ said the friend. Why not apply decision theory?’ I cite the professor’s answer from his
text: ‘Come on, Sandy, this is serious.’ [7]
1.13 The habitus thus ﬁlls the space between historical structure and human agency, between conscious
action and historic determination or, to use the classical Marxian terms, it brings together ‘base’ and
‘superstructure’. It provides a concrete answer to the question what is actually happening when (in Marx’
words) ‘men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under
circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and
transmitted from the past.’
1.14 But here lies the problem. All the elements of ‘habitus’ conspire to ensure reproduction and not
change. “Ce sont les innombrables strat￩gies de reproduction ￠ la fois ind￩pendantes, souvent jusqu’au
conﬂit, et orchestr￩es de tous les agents concern￩s, qui contribuent continuellement ￠ reproduire la
structure sociale, mais avec des al￩as et des rat￩s, issues des contradictions inh￩rentes ou des conﬂits
ou des concurrences entre les agents qui y sont engag￩s”( Le sens…, op. cit., 114). The problem of long-
term major historical change is how it can be brought about, at least for most of history before the 18th
century, by men and women living in ways designed to prevent any major change. But such
transformations did take place. How? In my view Bourdieu has no persuasive answer.
1.15 What he does show is that, in a society undergoing constant and dramatically accelerating change,
almost all human beings at the start of the 21st century are in the position of his Kabyles of the 1950s. All
of us are being precipitated into a world in which labour and human relations are not ‘la simple occupation
conforme ￠ la division traditionnelle des activit￩s ou ￠ l’￩change traditionnel des services’[8]. All men and
women must both adjust to and resist the pulverisation of the social world of social and personal relations
in which they have grown up and its both adjust to and resist its expectations. It is precisely the type of
society dedicated to ‘the pursuit of happiness’ (inseparable in a capitalist market from the purchase of
goods and services) by human beings conceived as individuals, which inevitably generates that ‘Mis￨re du
monde’[9] into which he enquired in the 1990s.
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accept their situation most of the time, is a problem that has long preoccupied those who wish to change
society for the better, and especially those whose political commitment to the cause of a better world
attracts them to the social sciences. As the superb chapter on ‘les modes de domination’ in Le Sens
Pratique[10] demonstrates, this is a major theme in Bourdieu, and his approach to it may well be
considered superior to Gramsci’s, who also confronted this problem with his concept of ‘hegemony’.
1.17 However, I have reservations about his terminology. In particular I wish Bourdieu’s had not chosen to
use the ambiguous and misleading term ‘violence’ (‘la violence symbolique’). Though violence, or the power
of physical coercion, is present, overtly or by implication in all social orders, the term as used by Bourdieu
diverts attention from the real modus operandi both of the ‘univers sociaux o￹ les relations de domination
se font, se d￩font et se refont dans et par les interactions entre les personnes’ and the social formations
‘m￩diatis￩es par des m￩canismes objectifs et institutionnalis￩s tels que le “march￩’ autor￩gul￩” au sens
de Karl Polanyi’[11]. ‘Violence’ throws no light on that process of fetishisation by which not only Marx’
‘commodities’ conceal the social relations that underlie them, but by which ‘les relations de pouvoir et de
d￩pendence ne s’￩tablissent plus directement entre les personnes; elles s’instaurent dans l’objectivit￩
m￪me, entre des institutions’ (Le sens…, op. cit., 229) – and as Bourdieu rightly holds, are all the more
socially effective as well as economically efﬁcient. But that, as he knows, is not a system of power in the
usual sense: it is of all forms of “persuasion clandestine” – Bourdieu’s words – ‘la plus implacable‘ because
‘exerc￩e tout simplement par l’ordre des choses.’ (R￩ponses, op. cit., 143).
1.18 Here Bourdieu’s analysis of how stability is achieved in societies conducted essentially by those who
hold power for their own purposes, or in their own interests, is particularly signiﬁcant for the contemporary
world. His insistence that social groups of rulers are formed and rule is exercised and transmitted on the
basis of a variety of sources of power (or, in his terms, ‘capital’) is not novel in itself, though brilliantly
discussed. However nobody has recognized more clearly than he that formal schooling is increasingly the
central maker and deﬁner of social domination in contemporary societies, even in those whose system of
educational and cultural differentiation is very different from the French, to which, throughout his career, he
devoted some of his most ambitious works.
1.19 How can I conclude these unsystematic remarks on Bourdieu’s relevance to historians? He is a
thinker whose work converges with that of historians, unlike Foucault, who took from history illustrations
for an already constructed narrative or the structuralists like (in his day) Althusser who tried to eliminate
what historians regard as history from their systems. More than most other social theorists, he is
constantly aware of three things. First, that it is impossible to reduce the vast wilderness in which human
beings act upon nature and each other, conscious or not of what they are doing, to a collection of gardens
governed by formal systems of rules. Second, that it is equally impossible – both in the practice of social
living and the theory of thinking about it – not to systematize human relations. And third, that ‘l’on peut
toujours ￩tablir qu’il aurait pu ￪tre autrement, qu’il en va autrement ailleurs, dans d’autres conditions’ and –
I would add, I hope in Bourdieu’s spirit – that it was different once and will be different in future, and so will
the way we think about it.
1.20 In conclusion, permit me a personal observation .What has brought me, a Marxist historian in the
British tradition together intellectually with my admired friend Pierre, was that I recognized my own
historical problematic in his work on the Kabyles, which is the foundation of the more generalized treatment
in Le Sens Pratique. For both of us it is how men and women live in periods of historical transformation. As
it happens we both asked ourselves the same kind of question about comparable phenomena at much the
same time. Bourdieu’s question about Kabyles in the 1950s was how can we understand ‘les conditions de
l’acquisition de l’habitus ￩conomique “capitaliste” chez des gens form￩s dans un cosmos pr￩capitaliste.’ It
happens that my own ﬁrst book, written about the same time about Mediterranean rural societies was
based on an almost identical question. Again, like Bourdieu, I found myself dissatisﬁed with the structural
models of the social anthropologists, though not for Bourdieu’s reasons (Choses dites, op. cit., p. 19) but
because they appeared to be essentially static, i.e. anti-historical and therefore incapable of explaining the
evolution of the human species that has actually taken place in the last 10,000 years. And both of us were
contemptuous of the relativism of postmodernists.
1.21 I think I even recognize my own hopes as a historian in his as a sociologist.
‘L’objet de la science sociale’ he wrote in Le Sens Pratique (p. 244) ‘est une r￩alit￩ qui
englobe toutes les luttes, individuelles et collectives, visant ￠ conserver ou transformer la
r￩alit￩, et en particulier celles qui ont pour enjeu l’imposition de la d￩ﬁnition l￩gitime de la
r￩alit￩ et dont l’efﬁcacit￩ proprement symbolique peut contribuer ￠ la conservation ou a la
subversion de l’ordre ￩tabli, c’est ￠ dire de la r￩alit￩.’
1.22 I am more sceptical than he was of the ability of political action by intellectuals to have much
immediate effect. But not the least of my many reasons for admiring Pierre, as a man as well as a social
thinker, is that he maintained to the end of his tragically abbreviated life a belief in the capacity of people
like us in this room to ‘subvertir l’ordre ￩tabli, c’est ￠ dire la r￩alit￩’ . That is why he inspired so many. Four
years ago he was awarded the Ernst Bloch prize, in memory of the German utopian social philosopher who
invented the ‘Principle of Hope’: man lives by hoping for a better future. Bourdieu, who was far from
utopian, did not, I think, write about Bloch, but he knew why he deserved the prize. Das Prinzip Hoffnung is
an indestructible and indispensable part of human existence. And Bourdieu remained committed to it,
because he wanted to change the world for the better. He did not believe that it was enough for
philosophers to interpret it.
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